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Abstract 
 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on pensions and saving by studying the 
influence of funded pension systems on the gross national saving rate using a sample of 
48 developed and developing countries over the 1980-2004 period. To the best of our 
knowledge, this updated database –which builds on the one assembled by Lopez 
Murphy and Musalem (2004)- is the largest on pension funds stocks and flows. Our 
panel data econometric results suggest that a one-dollar increase in pension saving 
increases national saving by between 0 and 20 cents. The structure of the system in 
terms of mandatory participation and portfolio composition does not affect the results, 
but the maturity of the system does seem to be a robust driver of national saving, 
inducing an increase of the saving rate of 0.3-0.5 percentage points for each additional 
year of existence. Reforming countries does not seem to have attained higher saving 
rates than others. Concerning other saving drivers, the old age dependency ratio and the 
urbanization ratio (even though the latter loses significance in some regressions) were 
negatively correlated with saving, while GDP growth, inflation, the terms of trade, and 
the current account displayed a positive sign. In terms of saving projections, the rather 
declining trend in pension saving implies that this is unlikely to boost the national 
saving rate, but the rising old age dependency ratio might cause, over a 25-year time 
horizon,  a  fall  in  the saving  rate  of  2.1 and 3.3  percentage  points   in  OECD     
and non-OECD countries, respectively. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Pension reform aimed at increasing the level of funding is often claimed to be triggered 
by the need to boost national saving. However, the underlying theory does not have a 
conclusive verdict on this matter. Moreover, available evidence is scarce and, with few 
exceptions, focused on developed economies. Last but not least, the impact of pension 
saving should not be assessed without previously control for other factors correlated 
with the national saving rate. 
 
The present paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence for a broad 
sample of countries and years. The database comprises 48 countries (19 from the OECD 
and 29 from the developing world) spanning the 1980-2004 period, and builds on the 
one assembled by Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004), which included information up 
to 2002 for 43 countries. In light that the panel is strongly unbalanced, the Annex lists 
the country and time coverage, as well as the sources of information. 
 
The work is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the existing theory and evidence, 
Section 2 statistically describes the database and highlights several stylized facts, and 
Section 3 reports the econometric findings. Some conclusions close.
Section 1: Working Hypotheses and Literature Review 
 
This section will be devoted to establish the expected outcome of the econometric 
analysis in light of the theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings. The 
review does not intend to be exhaustive whatsoever, but instead will try to tightly 
summarize the existing body of work –the interested reader is referred to Kohl and 
O`Brien (1998), Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004) and Davis and Hu (2004) for 
thorough surveys of the literature on pensions and saving. 
 
The natural benchmark to gauge the effect of pension saving on national saving is the 
frictionless permanent income model. In this model, a representative, rational and 
forward-looking agent, who has access to perfect capital markets, makes consumption 
plans factoring in his expected lifetime wealth. Moreover, since his preferences are such 
that the marginal utility is decreasing, he will strive to smooth consumption on a period-
by-period basis (consumption will be constant over time only when the interest rate 
equals the rate of time preference, though). Under these circumstances, pension saving 
will have no impact on total saving: since the agent is supposed to have already decided 
how much to save, changing the form in which he does it is immaterial –he will just 
reduce other saving components to offset for the increase in pension saving.  
 
Nevertheless, there are at least four crucial assumptions underneath the ineffectiveness 
of pension saving, namely: (i) pension savings are liquid, (ii) agents do not face 
financial constraints, (iii) there is no precautionary saving, and (iv) agents are 
homogeneous, fully rational and altruistic. Ruling out some of these conditions 
drastically modifies the earlier statements. Specifically, saving can actually change in a 
variety of cases: 
 
(a) Contributions are mandatory, there are financial constraints and voluntary saving is 
initially low. In this case, the desire to maintain the previous consumption level may not 
be attained via borrowing (negative saving) due to the credit market imperfection, and 
so the increase in pension saving will translate into a net increase in household saving; 
 
(b) Pensions –either voluntary or mandatory- are illiquid and not accepted as collateral, 
so pension wealth is not a suitable vehicle for precautionary saving. As a result, liquid 
non-pension saving will not fall one-for-one with pension saving;  
 
(c) Unlike unfunded regimes, which set a mandatory minimum retirement age, workers 
in funded regimes may be given the option to retire earlier. Those exercising this option 
will save more, in excess of their contributions to the pension system, in order to 
provide for such early retirement;  
 
(d) As unfunded social security systems encourage free riding behavior on the part of 
workers, the passage from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funded regimes is likely to boost 
national saving to the extent that the latter scheme ensures the correspondence between 
contributions and benefits. However, this conclusion might be qualified when transition 
costs are taken into account, owing to the intergenerational transfer involved –if current 
workers bear the burden via higher future taxes, their future disposable income will go 
down and so their current saving will go up, while the consumption of current retirees 
might increase provided that, under the new system, they unexpectedly receive higher 
pensions. As a result,  the net  effect on national saving is ambiguous;  
 
(e) By the same token, the creation of a funded system is likely to raise awareness about 
the importance of retirement saving, in what is sometimes labeled as a “recognition 
effect”; 
 
(f) Thaler (1990) stresses the fact that individuals are not as rational as economic theory 
assumes and instead display several psychological biases. Among them, they might take 
pension wealth as a separate asset class only disposable for retirement or extreme 
emergencies, and thus not computable as part of traditional permanent income. If that is 
the case, no substitution between pension and ordinary saving should be observed, 
suggesting that changes in the former will have a large incidence on national saving. 
 
Against the background of an ambiguous theoretical nexus between pension and 
national saving, the vast majority of the empirical evidence seems to claim a positive 
influence of pension saving on national saving, although estimated effects differ 
markedly. A common finding is that ordinary and pension saving are imperfect 
substitutes, implying that personal saving increases by less than the increase in pension 
saving. For example, in the lower bound, Pesando (1997) obtains a coefficient of around 
0.4 for the U.S. for private saving, which falls to 0.2 after computing the fiscal cost of 
tax incentives; in the upper bound, Rossi and Visco (1995) reach a coefficient of 0.66 
for Italy. Most studies focus on industrial countries and rely on time series analysis 
without controlling for additional saving determinants. In contrast, the present work will 
pursue a panel estimation for both developed and developing countries on the basis of 
reduced-form national saving equations encompassing a number of explanatory 
variables. In this line of research, three main preceding papers can be cited: Baillu and 
Reisen (1997) employ a panel of 11 OECD and non-OECD countries, concluding that 
funded pension systems increase private saving, but much more strongly in the latter set 
of countries. Edwards (1995) shows that unfunded social security lowers private saving 
in developing countries. Finally, Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004) contend, using a 
broad sample of countries and years, that mandatory funded regimes increase the 
national saving rate, but voluntary arrangements do not.  
 
Section 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports some statistic features of the sample that will constitute the groundwork 
for the subsequent econometric analysis. It must be highlighted that:  
(a) The national saving rate, measured as a ratio to Gross Disposable National Income 
(GDNI), is similar in OECD (22.3%) and non-OECD countries (21.5%), but there is 
much more dispersion across in countries in the second group (the standard deviations 
are 4.2% and 8.1%, respectively); 1
(b) Pension saving to GDNI (with pension saving defined as the annual change in the 
value of the stock of pension funds) is larger in the OECD zone (3% of GDNI against 
2.4% in other countries), but in both cases accounts for a non-negligible portion of 
national saving (13.5% and 11.2%, respectively). Comparing pension reforming and 
non-reforming countries, the difference in pension saving is of the same order of 
magnitude (2.3% in the former and 2.8% in the latter) –note, by looking at the Pension 
Reform Dummy variable, that reforms have taken place exclusively in non-OECD 
countries, and that 50% of this group has engaged in such process in the last 25 years;2  
(c) The stock of pension funds differs significantly, with an average of 27% in OECD 
countries and of 15.8% in non-OECD economies; 
(d) The age of the funded pension system is proxied by the number of years for which 
information on the stock of pension funds is available.3 In this respect, OECD systems 
appear to have been running longer than others; 
(e) Mandatory regimes exist in half of the sample, but they prevail more in non-OECD 
countries (70%) than in the OECD (10%). Breaking down the sample into reforming 
and non-reforming countries, the former reveal a clear preference for mandatory 
schemes (90%) and the latter for voluntary programs (70%); and 
(f) Pension regimes in reforming countries display financial portfolios with 
predominance of public debt and bank deposits (71.1%), in contrast with non-reforming 
                                                 
1 Eastern European countries are considered as developing countries, regardless of whether they are 
members of the European Union. 
2 Countries are classified as pension reforming following information provided by FIAP (www.fiap.cl). In 
spite of its pension reform enacted in 1998 and implemented since 1999, Sweden is not classified as a 
reforming country because the available information on pension assets mostly comes from the pre-reform 
period. 
3 While information was available for newly created regimes on the starting year, this was not the case for 
other countries. 
countries (37.7%). Once again, the difference resembles that between non-OECD 
(68.7%) and OECD (28.6%) countries.4
The simple correlation coefficients in Table 2 do not provide any solid clue as to how 
pension variables affect the national saving rate, as most values, yet statistically 
significant, are below 50%. Of course, simple correlations are exploratory exercises that 
ought to be validated or not by multivariate regression analysis. At any rate, the national 
saving rate seems to be lower in systems that were reformed, have a high fraction 
invested in public sector and bank liabilities, and are mandatory. Conversely, national 
saving rates appear to be higher in older and larger funded systems. The other 
correlations just confirm some salient characteristics noted earlier in this section.
                                                 
4 This allocation can be explained by: (i) a preference for domestic assets (in some cases accompanied by 
mandatory investment guidelines), (ii) the lack of a liquid and well-diversified set of alternative 
instruments in thin capital markets, and (iii) the crowding out exerted by public debt issues in countries 
with sizable fiscal deficits. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (*)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Full Sample 
National Saving Rate 1233 21.9 6.5 1.6 54.1
Pension Saving 574 2.7 3.7 -9.0 20.4
Pension Funds Stock to GDNI 622 21.1 24.6 0.0 119.7
Age of Funded Pension System 721 10.4 7.5 1.0 36.0
Pension Reform Dummy 2250 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
Share of public and bank debt (%) 1394 50.9 26.4 5.0 95.0
Mandatory System Dummy 2250 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
OECD Countries
National Saving Rate 599 22.3 4.2 13.3 37.2
Pension Saving 274 3.0 4.2 -9.0 19.2
Pension Funds Stock to GDNI 293 27.0 28.3 0.6 119.7
Age of Funded Pension System 361 12.4 8.1 1.0 36.0
Pension Reform Dummy 900 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Share of public and bank debt (%) 619 28.6 16.2 5.0 73.0
Mandatory System Dummy 900 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Non-OECD Countries
National Saving Rate 634 21.5 8.1 1.6 54.1
Pension Saving 300 2.4 3.1 -7.5 20.4
Pension Funds Stock to GDNI 329 15.8 19.5 0.0 73.9
Age of Funded Pension System 360 8.4 6.2 1.0 29.0
Pension Reform Dummy 1350 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Share of public and bank debt (%) 775 68.7 18.3 32.0 95.0
Mandatory System Dummy 1350 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0
Pension Reforming Countries
National Saving Rate 299 17.7 5.7 1.6 35.3
Pension Saving 125 2.3 3.3 -5.2 17.1
Pension Funds Stock to GDNI 140 9.9 14.3 0.0 68.8
Age of Funded Pension System 144 6.5 4.9 1.0 24.0
Share of public and bank debt (%) 550 71.1 17.4 38.0 95.0
Mandatory System Dummy 675 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0
Non-Pension Reforming Countries
National Saving Rate 934 23.2 6.2 10.1 54.1
Pension Saving 449 2.8 3.8 -9.0 20.4
Pension Funds Stock to GDNI 482 24.3 26.0 0.0 119.7
Age of Funded Pension System 577 11.4 7.7 1.0 36.0
Share of public and bank debt (%) 844 37.7 22.8 5.0 90.0
Mandatory System Dummy 1575 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0
(*) All saving rates are gross of capital consumption and scaled by GDNI.  
See Annex for sample composition and sources.  

Table 2: Correlation Matrix (^)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 National Saving Rate 1
2 Pension Saving -0.03 1
3 Pension Funds Stock 0.14*** 0.67*** 1
4 Age of Funded Pension System 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.42*** 1
5 Pension Reform Dummy -0.36*** -0.06 -0.25*** -0.26*** 1
6 Share of public and bank debt (%) -0.27*** -0.11** -0.33*** -0.25*** 0.62*** 1
7 Mandatory System Dummy -0.18*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.04 0.60*** 0.52*** 1
(^) (***) Significant at 1%; (**) Significant at 5%: (*) Significant at 10%.  
 
Section 3: Econometric Results 
 
Relying on the theoretical foundations discussed in Section 1, a number of econometric 
results will be presented next to assess the empirical nexus between pension and 
national saving rates. In order to avoid misspecification and the consequent undesirable 
estimate properties, several controls will be introduced in the national saving rate 
equation following the profuse literature in the field (see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and 
Serven (2001) and other research work in the References section). The old dependency 
ratio (the proportion of people older than 65 to that between 15 and 64) depresses 
saving rates as a result of life cycle considerations –old people have higher propensities 
to consume. In a similar fashion, young people consumes but does not produce, and thus 
the young dependency ratio (the proportion of people younger than 15 to that between 
15 and 64) should push saving rates down. In the presence of a precautionary saving 
motive, it may be expected that people living in urban (as opposed to rural) locations 
should have better opportunities to diversify their sources of labor income and face less 
uncertainty, with a resulting negative impact of urbanization ratios on saving. In the 
spirit of permanent income models, per capita GDP growth increases saving as long as 
consumers take this income growth as temporary. The inflation rate, a standard indicator 
of macroeconomic uncertainty, may increase precautionary saving, but on the other 
hand may reduce it provided consumers decide to spend more in anticipation to lower 
purchasing power in the future. Given the widespread existence of financial constraints 
(see Japelli and Pagano (1994) and Shea (1996)), the expansion of credit (measured by 
the change in the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP) may act against saving 
(see Loayza et al. (2000)). These variables come from the World Development 
Indicators produced by the World Bank. 
 
The baseline regressions are presented in Table 3, where fixed and random effects 
techniques are alternatively used. Pension saving, the main variable of interest, yields a 
positive coefficient in the neighborhood of 0.1, which turns out to be statistically 
significant at 5% under fixed effects and at 10% under random effects. This implies that 
funded pension systems exert a positive and significant impact on national saving, with 
a one-dollar increase in pension saving translating into 10 cents of additional national 
saving. An unreported Hausman test led to reject the random in favor of the fixed 
effects, and consequently only the latter estimates will be presented. As for the control 
variables, none of them has a significant effect contrary to the theory. The strongest 
results are the negative coefficient on Old Dependency Ratio and the positive one on 
GDP Growth and Inflation. Urban Population is negative but not significant, but it is in 
the next estimations. Both regressions include annual time dummies, which are not 
shown in the table to save space, but are obviously available on request. Wald and F 
tests of joint significance support the model, in spite of quite low R-squared values, a 
point we will resume later on.   
 
 
Table 3: Baseline Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: 
National Saving Rate 
(1) (2) 
Explanatory Variables   
Pension Saving 0.098 
(1.71)* 
0.12 
(2.23)** 
Old Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-31.37 
(-3.42)*** 
-64.78 
(-3.39)*** 
Young Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-16.67 
(-4.35)*** 
-2.83 
(-0.48) 
Urban Population -0.035 
(-1.06) 
-0.125 
(-1.38) 
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.19 
(4.01)*** 
0.162 
(3.73)*** 
Inflation Rate 0.073 
(2.89)*** 
0.105 
(4.57)*** 
Change in Credit to the 
Private Sector 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
Method   Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 518 518 
No. Countries 48 48 
Longest Annual Period  1981-2004 1981-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes 
R-Squared 0.131 0.008 
Wald (RE) and F (FE) 
Statistics (p-value) 
127 
(0.000) 
5.3 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
In Table 4, interaction terms are introduced to assess whether specific features of the 
pension system have any differential explanatory power on the national saving rate. 
Regression (3) starts by interacting pension saving with a dummy taking a value of 1 if 
the country has undertaken a pension reform from an unfunded to a funded system. The 
new variable enters significantly with a coefficient of 0.26, greater than before, but 
lessens the significance of Pension Saving per se. Conversely, none of the remaining 
interactive terms are significantly different from zero, as it is Pension Saving, most 
likely owning to multicollinearity. Columns (4) to (6) implies that: (i) mandatory 
regimes are not conducive to stimulate saving, (ii) countries with larger market 
capitalization, in which pension assets can be more efficiently invested, do not enjoy 
any particular advantage in the eyes of contributors at the time of making saving 
decisions, and (iii) a heavy exposure to public and bank debt (a symptom of potential 
fiscal complications, thin capital markets, and high financial risk) is unimportant, as 
well. 
 
Table 4: Interaction Terms  
 
Dependent 
Variable: National 
Saving Rate 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
    
Pension Saving 0.059 
(0.99) 
0.116 
(1.77)* 
-0.067 
(-0.97) 
0.032 
(0.3) 
Pension Saving * 
Pension Reform 
Dummy 
0.258 
(2.05)** 
   
Pension Saving * 
Mandatory System 
 0.0025 
(0.03) 
  
Pension Saving * 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
  0.0007 
(1.36) 
 
Pension Saving * 
Share of Public and 
Bank Debt 
   0.002 
(0.86) 
Old Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-80.24 
(-4.28)*** 
-80.20 
(-4.25)*** 
-91.37 
(-6.19)*** 
-79.02 
(-3.32)*** 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-1.13 
(-0.2) 
-1.19 
(-0.21) 
4.13 
(0.88) 
-69.87 
(-4.78)*** 
Urban Population -0.213 
(-2.29)** 
-0.219 
(-2.34)** 
-0.189 
(-2.4)** 
-0.589 
(-5.06)*** 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.161 
(3.79)*** 
0.164 
(3.83)*** 
0.029 
(0.86) 
0.30 
(5.28)*** 
Inflation Rate 0.09 
(3.94)*** 
0.094 
(3.99)*** 
0.118 
(4.8)*** 
0.101 
(4.39)*** 
Change in Credit to 
the Private Sector 
-0.0027 
(-0.18) 
-0.004 
(-0.31) 
-0.0000 
(-0.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.3) 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 518 518 518 332 
No. Countries 48 48 48 30 
Longest Annual 
Period 
1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.005 0.006 0.0023 0.147 
F Statistics (p-
value) 
5.22 
(0.000) 
5.04 
(0.000) 
5.02 
(0.000) 
4.6 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
 
Next, Pension Saving is interacted with Pension Fund Assets. The underlying 
hypothesis is that, as the system evolves and matures, a gradually catching “recognition 
effect” is more likely to be at work, inducing more saving. However, Regression (7) 
does not pick it up, even though the Pension Saving coefficient doubles compared with 
the baseline Regression (2). Regression (8) reexamines this effect by introducing a 
proxy for the age of the pension system (i.e., for each observation, the number of 
accumulated years for which there is information on pension assets –see also Footnote 3 
above).5 The coefficient is again not different from zero. However, when Age is 
included separately instead of interacted with Pension Saving, the estimate not only is 
highly significant but renders a coefficient of 0.5, meaning that each additional year 
adds 0.5 percentage points to the national saving rate, everything else equal. The 
presence of outliers is tested by dropping all observations before 1990. When keeping 
414 out of the total 518 observations, the Pension Saving coefficient loses its statistical 
significance. Nevertheless, as shown by Regression (11), Age remains highly 
significant. 
                                                 
5 This variable may also capture another effect linked to the maturity of the system. The institution of a 
funded mandatory system may increase the share of illiquid assets of the private sector beyond its desired 
level. Since changing the stock of such assets is a slow and costly process, the public may restore their 
optimal mixed of liquid and illiquid assets by increasing current saving to accumulate the former. 
Table 5: Additional Interaction Terms and Time Series Subsamples 
 
Dependent Variable: 
National Saving Rate 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Explanatory Variables      
Pension Saving 0.248 
(2.26)** 
0.181 
(1.73)* 
0.118 
(2.26)** 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
Pension Saving * 
Pension Fund Stock 
-0.002 
(-1.48) 
    
Pension Saving * Age 
of the Funded Pension 
System 
 -0.0044 
(-0.7) 
   
Age of the Funded 
Pension System 
  0.49 
(3.99)*** 
 0.316 
(4.98)*** 
Old Age Dependency 
Ratio 
-80.45 
(-4.28)***
-79.93 
(-4.24)***
-80.21 
(-4.26)***
-93.82 
(-6.46)*** 
-93.82 
(-6.46)*** 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-0.30 
(-0.05) 
-0.81 
(-0.14) 
-1.19 
(-0.21) 
6.31 
(1.26) 
6.31 
(1.26) 
Urban Population -0.217 
(-2.33)** 
-0.218 
(-2.33)** 
-0.219 
(-2.34)** 
-0.224 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.224 
(-2.86)*** 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.165 
(3.86)*** 
0.166 
(3.86)*** 
0.164 
(3.83)*** 
0.063 
(1.91)* 
0.063 
(1.91)* 
Inflation Rate 0.084 
(3.57)*** 
0.091 
(3.86)*** 
0.094 
(4.11)*** 
0.091 
(3.84)*** 
0.091 
(3.84)*** 
Change in Credit to 
the Private Sector 
-0.004 
(-0.28) 
-0.005 
(-0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.35) 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 518 518 518 414 414 
No. Countries 48 48 48 48 48 
Longest Annual Period 1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 1990-2004 1990-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.005 0.005 0.03 0.0001 0.005 
F Statistics (p-value) 5.13 
(0.000) 
5.06 
(0.000) 
5.21 
(0.000) 
5.38 
(0.000) 
5.38 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
 
The next robustness check consists in partitioning the sample into OECD and non-
OECD countries. At first glance, Regressions (12) and (13) lead to believe that the 
significance of Pension Saving is driven by non-OECD countries, a finding that can be 
justified by the more extended prevalence of borrowing constraints and the lack of use 
of pension wealth as collateral. However, a closer examination casts doubt about this 
conclusion. Regression (14) repeats the exercise by excluding observations before 1990 
and including the age of the funded pension system, as in Regression (11). Now, 
Pension Saving becomes non-significant, while Age passes the test once again. Since 
Pension Saving remains non-significant after excluding Age in Regression (14), we 
infer that there might be influential observation in the pre-1990 period. 
 
The empirical saving literature stresses that an array of market imperfections break the 
full offset between private and public saving, on one hand, and between personal and 
corporate saving, on the other hand. The failure of the Ricardian equivalence and the 
incomplete piercing of the corporate veil suggests that the government and the corporate 
saving rates are relevant explanatory variables of the national saving rate. 
Correspondingly, Regression (15) incorporates these two additional controls. 
Unfortunately, relatively long series of saving broken down by institutional sector are 
only available for 16 OECD countries (see Bebczuk and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), from 
where data comes). With observations shrank to 200, results are now favorable to a 
positive effect of Pension Saving of the order of 0.13. Concerning social expenditures, 
the prior is that public retirement coverage should directly reduce government saving 
and indirectly private sector saving, with an overall negative influence on national 
saving. Regression (16) strongly confirms this belief –data limitations narrow down the 
sample to 321 observations for 37 countries.
Table 6: OECD vs. non-OECD Countries and Social Expenditures 
 
Dependent 
Variable: National 
Saving Rate 
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Pension Saving 0.044 
(0.9) 
0.204 
(2.29)** 
0.013 
(0.20) 
0.131 
(2.83)*** 
0.0136 
(0.25) 
Government Saving 
to GDNI 
   0.662 
(9.56)*** 
 
Corporate Saving to 
GDNI 
   0.637 
(6.08)*** 
 
Age of the Funded 
Pension System 
  0.342 
(2.15)** 
  
Social Expenditure 
to GDP 
    -116.94 
(-14.93)*** 
Old Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-63.50 
(-3.83)*** 
-117.99 
(-2.04)** 
-150.1 
(-2.83)*** 
-96.63 
(-4.13)*** 
-56.73 
(-1.91)* 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-8.55 
(-0.44) 
37.66 
(3.99)*** 
19.22 
(2.17)** 
-80.64 
(-4.55)*** 
-21.71 
(-2.52)** 
Urban Population -0.42 
(-4.43)*** 
-0.312 
(-2.09)** 
0.248 
(1.48) 
-0.861 
(-3.33)*** 
0.117 
(0.69) 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.319 
(3.88)*** 
0.114 
(2.22)** 
0.037 
(0.88) 
0.173 
(1.89)* 
0.046 
(0.9) 
Inflation Rate 0.059 
(2.4)** 
0.07 
(1.8)* 
0.10 
(3.28)*** 
-0.191 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.29) 
Change in Credit to 
the Private Sector 
0.003 
(0.29) 
-0.027 
(-0.73) 
0.028 
(0.98) 
-0.013 
(-1.07) 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 242 276 234 200 321 
No. Countries 19 [OECD] 29 [Non-
OECD] 
29 [Non-
OECD] 
16 37 
Longest Annual 
Period 
1981-2004 1981-2004 1990-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.033 0.045 0.017 0.09 0.164 
F Statistics (p-
value) 
4.13 
(0.000) 
6.91 
(0.000) 
1.74 
(0.03) 
11.2 
(0.000) 
14.02 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
Saving has been found to be correlated with a number of macroeconomic variables. In 
order to prioritize parsimony, the model chosen so far includes some, but not all, of 
those macroeconomic regressors. To ensure that results are not being driven by omitted 
variables, Regressions (17) and (18) add two other popular driving forces of saving: per 
capita GDP and the current account to GDP. Since it is expected that richer economies 
have better institutions and that the willingness to save increase with excess income 
beyond subsistence, the predicted sign is positive. On the other hand, the presence of 
national financial constraints gives rises to a positive link between the current account 
balance and the saving rate, in view that national and foreign savings might act as 
substitutes for each other. The latter hypothesis, but not the former, is supported by the 
data. More important to this study, this new specification does not affect the positive 
and significant sign on Pension Saving for the whole sample. The terms of trade, 
another often used control variable in saving regressions, is incorporated in Regression 
(19) with the expected positive sign and a reinforced significance of Pension Saving. 
Also, in an unreported regression, GDP growth was replaced by GDNI growth, a more 
accurate measure of income changes, but results remain virtually the same in light of the 
almost perfect correlation between both variables.  
 
Meanwhile, Regression (20) replaces the contemporaneous values of Pension Saving, 
GDP Growth, Inflation and Change in Credit for their first lag. The rationale is that, in 
macroeconomic analysis, there exists the suspicion that some regressors are not strictly 
exogenous, as implicitly assumed in econometrics. Endogeneity creates biased and 
inconsistent estimators. While it is unlikely that Pension Saving is an endogenous 
variable –in particular, mandatory pension saving is exogenous by definition-, this 
might be the case for other variables. One way to deal with this caveat is to use internal 
instruments (lagged values of the respective variable) to construct Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimators. Even though this is a rather popular and sophisticated 
technique, it is quite often found that GMM generates weak instruments, which in the 
end means that the endogeneity issue is far from being solved. Instead, Regression (20) 
resorts to another, much simpler option, which is to directly use first lags as regressors. 
Anyway, no major changes come up from the inspection of the new estimates.  
 
Table 8 replicates the above exercises but restricting to sample to the group of 
developing countries. It looks reassuring that the coefficients on per capita GDP, the 
current account and the terms of trade maintain their significance and, even more 
importantly, that Pension Saving enters positively as well, with an estimate in the range 
of 0.2-0.3. Additionally, we include the stock of credit to GDP instead of the flow as in 
previous tables. This variable may either capture financial constraints (with a negative 
impact on national saving) or institutional strength (with a positive impact). The results 
in Regression (23) seem to be in line with the latter interpretation. 
 
Table 7: Additional Macroeconomic and Lagged Regressors 
 
Dependent 
Variable: National 
Saving Rate 
(17) (18) (19) (20) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
    
Pension Saving 0.113 
(2.15)** 
0.101 
(2.22)** 
0.155 
(2.94)*** 
 
Lagged Pension 
Saving 
   0.145 
(2.8)*** 
Old Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-82.03 
(-4.32)*** 
-53.64 
(-3.24)*** 
-72.1 
(-3.87)*** 
-78.33 
(-4.42)*** 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
1.72 
(0.25) 
4.01 
(0.8) 
-6.09 
(-1.05) 
0.889 
(0.16) 
Urban Population -0.228 
(-2.42)** 
-0.019 
(-0.23) 
-0.248 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.058 
(-0.58) 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.168 
(3.9)*** 
0.286 
(7.39)*** 
0.175 
(4.18)*** 
 
Lagged Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
   0.144 
(3.37)*** 
Inflation Rate 0.097 
(4.18)*** 
0.074 
(3.67)*** 
0.091 
(4.07)*** 
 
Lagged Inflation 
Rate 
   0.068 
(3.07)*** 
Change in Credit to 
the Private Sector 
-0.0031 
(-0.2) 
0.03 
(2.26) 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
 
Lagged Change in 
Credit to the Private 
Sector 
   0.001 
(0.09) 
Per Capita GDP -0.00012 
(-0.8) 
   
Current Account to 
GDP 
 0.422 
(11.79)*** 
  
Terms of Trade   0.119 
(6.06)*** 
 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 518 518 489 489 
No. Countries 48 48 43 45 
Longest Annual 
Period 
1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 1982-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.002 0.118 0.019 0.009 
F Statistics (p-
value) 
5.07 
(0.000) 
10.74 
(0.000) 
6.66 
(0.000) 
5.23 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
Table 8: Additional Macroeconomic and Lagged Regressors, Non-OECD 
Countries 
 
Dependent 
Variable: National 
Saving Rate 
(21) (22) (23) (24) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
    
Pension Saving 0.19 
(2.14)** 
0.236 
(2.92)*** 
0.282 
(2.89)*** 
0.209 
(2.38)** 
Old Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-110.05 
(-1.83)*** 
-100.0 
(-1.95)* 
-153.5 
(-2.71)*** 
-145.1 
(-2.54)** 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
4.88 
(5.03)*** 
3.56 
(4.23)*** 
-4.17 
(4.46)*** 
4.19 
(4.5)*** 
Urban Population -0.343 
(-2.30)** 
-0.088 
(-0.65) 
-0.324 
(-2.25)** 
-0.331 
(-2.26)** 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.106 
(2.12)** 
0.194 
(4.09)*** 
0.121 
(2.44)** 
0.143 
(2.81)*** 
Inflation Rate 0.082 
(2.31)** 
0.009 
(0.27) 
0.07 
(2.02)** 
0.071 
(1.96)* 
Per Capita GDP -0.0004 
(-1.66)* 
   
Current Account to 
GDP 
 0.349 
(6.87)*** 
  
Terms of Trade   0.086 
(3.13)*** 
 
Credit to the Private 
Sector to GDP 
   0.032 
(1.97)* 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No. Observ. 286 286 263 279 
No. Countries 29 [Non-
OECD] 
29 [Non-
OECD] 
29 [Non-
OECD] 
29 [Non-
OECD] 
Longest Annual 
Period 
1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 1982-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.078 0.002 0.037 0.021 
F Statistics (p-
value) 
7.57 
(0.000) 
10.39 
(0.000) 
8.52 
(0.000) 
7.48 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
Finally, Regressions (24) and (25) include the lagged national saving rate in the right-
hand side. This obeys to the presumption, documented in several empirical 
contributions, that saving decisions have a strong inertial behavior. One rationale for 
this is that underlying preferences are based on habit formation (see Dynan (2000)). 
However, a usually overlooked drawback is that, when the other regressors are 
persistent over time, the lagged dependent variable will be even more significant once it 
will partly reflect the explanatory power of those variables, creating a serious 
multicollinearity problem without adding new information. Furthermore, the 
simultaneous inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects 
renders the coefficient inconsistent. Nonetheless, Table 9 reveals that there is a 
considerable inertia in saving decisions, as the lagged value yields a coefficient of 0.7 
with fixed effects and 0.89 with random effects. As discussed before, this change 
creates a noticeable variation in other coefficients, although Pension Saving remains 
significant in Regression (24). Undoubtedly, the most remarkable news is that the R-
Squared jumps to 0.71 (fixed effects) and 0.94 (random effects) from its extremely low 
levels in previous regressions, signalling that inertia is certainly relevant in spite of the 
associated econometric shortcomings. Consequently, while repeating that the estimated 
coefficients are not reliable enough to measure marginal impacts, Regression (25) can 
anyway be used for out-of-sample projections because of its remarkable goodness-of-fit. 
Table 9: Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent Variable: 
National Saving 
Rate 
(24) (25) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
  
Lagged National 
Saving 
0.705 
(25.7)*** 
0.889 
(50.26)*** 
Pension Saving 0.075 
(2.27)** 
0.036 
(1.2) 
Old Age 
Dependency Ratio 
-42.51 
(-3.55)*** 
-10.50 
(-3.21)*** 
Young Age 
Dependency Ratio 
0.818 
(0.23) 
-5.36 
(-3.65)*** 
Urban Population -0.008 
(-0.13) 
-0.006 
(-0.67) 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
0.045 
(1.64) 
0.037 
(1.34) 
Inflation Rate 0.045 
(3.07)*** 
0.013 
(0.92) 
Change in Credit to 
the Private Sector 
-0.017 
(-1.8)* 
-0.019 
(-1.85)* 
Method   Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
No. Observ. 518 518 
No. Countries 48 48 
Longest Annual 
Period 
1981-2004 1981-2004 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes No 
R-Squared 0.71 0.942 
F Statistics (p-value) 32.11 
(0.000) 
3510.5 
(0.000) 
Note: T Statistics in parenthesis, (***) Significant at 1%,  
(**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
Conclusions 
 
The goal of this paper was to assess the effect of pension saving on the gross national 
saving rate. After revising the theoretical underpinnings, many different models were 
run to that end. The results point to a positive impact, even though they are somewhat 
fragile to particular sample changes. Taking a conservative position, the main finding is 
that a one-dollar increase in pension saving increases national saving by between 0 and 
20 cents. The structure of the system in terms of mandatory participation and portfolio 
composition does not affect the results, but the maturity of the system does seem to be a 
robust driver of national saving, inducing an increase of the saving rate of 0.3-0.5 
percentage points for each additional year of existence. Reforming countries does not 
seem to have attained higher saving rates than others. Concerning other saving 
determinants, the old age dependency ratio and the urbanization ratio (even though the 
latter loses significance in some regressions) were negatively correlated with saving, 
while the GDP growth, the inflation rate, the terms of trade, and the current account 
displayed a positive sign.  
 
Based on the evolution over the last decade, it looks unlikely that pension saving will be 
an upward force for national saving rates in the near future, even under a marginal 
positive effect, simply because pension saving has been declining as of late (for 
instance, it went down from 4.1% of GDNI in 1995-1999 to 1.5% in 2000-2003 in 
OECD countries and from 2.2% to 1.6% in non-OECD countries). As for the old age 
dependency ratio, it has been increasing on average by 0.13 percentage points per year 
in the former group and 0.11 in the latter since 1995. Using the coefficients estimated in 
Regressions (12) and (13), this accounts for an annual reduction of the national saving 
rate of 0.08 and 0.13 percentage points. Over a 25-year time horizon, this implies a 
pronounced accumulated fall in the saving rate of 2.1 and 3.3 percentage points, 
respectively. 
Annex: Sample Coverage and Sources 
 Country 
 
Period 
Argentina 1994-2004 
Australia 1988-2001 
Austria  1993-2004 
Belgium 1981-2004 
Bolivia  1997-2004 
Brazil 1994-2003 
Bulgaria 2001-2004 
Canada 1980-2001 
Chile  1981-2004 
Colombia  1994-2004 
Costa Rica  1991-2003 
Czech Republic 1994-2004 
Denmark  1988-2004 
Egypt 1993-2001 
El Salvador 1998-2004 
Estonia 2002-2004 
France 2001-2003 
Germany  1980-2004 
Hungary 1994-2004 
Iceland 1980-2004 
India 1990-1998 
Ireland 2001-2004 
Italy 1990-2001 
Japan 1989-2001 
Jordan  1980-2002 
Kazahstan 1998-2003 
Korea 1986-2001 
Malaysia 1976-2002 
Mexico 1997-2004 
Morocco 1988-2002 
Annex: Sample Coverage and Sources (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Period 
Nepal  1997-2002 
Netherlands 1981-2001 
New Zealand  2001-2004 
Norway 1980-2001 
Panama 1996-2002 
Peru 1993-2004 
Philippines  1993-2002 
Poland  1999-2004 
Portugal 1989-2004 
Singapore 1983-2002 
Slovenia 2001-2004 
South Africa 1989-2002 
Spain 2001-2004 
Sweden 1990-2001 
Thailand 1984-1998 
United Kingdom  1980-2001 
United States 1981-2001 
Uruguay 1996-2004 
 
Sources: Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004), OECD (2005), World Bank EU8 (2005), 
and FIAP (www.fiap.cl). 
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